Saudi Arabia’s Stance on Israel-Iran Escalation: War or Diplomacy?
Saudi Arabia, caught in uncertainty, views an Israeli Iranian war as ill-timed, neutrality as uncomfortable, and descent into the fray as inevitable.
Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Photo by Anadolu Images
Rising tensions between Iran and Israel, culminating in retaliatory warfare since the 7th of October, have plunged Saudi Arabia into a state of uncertainty. Despite Riyadh’s long-standing rivalry with Tehran, the recent truce with Iran, escalating regional tensions and Saudi Arabia’s own domestic interests have led its leaders to adopt a more cautious and pacifist tone.
This time, Saudi Arabia has framed its response to Israel’s actions against Iran in legal rather than political terms. Riyadh condemned the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran as a “blatant violation” of Iran’s sovereignty. Earlier, Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April, followed by Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone barrage two weeks later, prompted Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states, to swiftly condemn the Israeli attack and warn of “the dangers of war and its dire consequences”.
Despite historic tensions with Iran, Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in diplomatic efforts to prevent a catastrophic escalation. Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi foreign minister, has been at the forefront of communication with all parties involved, advocating “double restraint” and stressing that “we do not need more conflict in our region”.
The energy-rich Gulf monarchy, still reeling from the fallout of the Arab Spring uprisings and grappling with the plight of Gaza, now faces another looming disaster on its doorstep – a full-scale war between Israel and Iran. Initially, Saudi Arabia, along with other regional states, refused to open its airspace to Israel and the United States during the attack.
Saudi Arabia not ready for regional war
Saudi Arabia, once eager to ‘cut off the head of the snake‘ – as revealed in WikiLeaks cables in 2008, when King Abdullah fervently called for a US attack on Iran before it achieved nuclear capabilities – now faces a far more complex situation. That ‘snake’ has become a hydra, and Iran’s influence is spreading.
Adding to the complexity is the Saudi problem of confusion. The Saudis tend to feel abandoned by the US whenever Washington reconciles with Tehran. Yet they worry about the consequences of a US or Israeli war on Iran, a war in which they would probably pay the highest price. This fear is compounded by disappointment, especially with Democrats such as President Joe Biden, who once threatened to turn the kingdom into a pariah.
Today, the Saudis are living through their own version of Soviet glasnost and perestroika – Vision 2030, a period of reform and diversification. It also reflects a strategic shift: partnering with China, withdrawing from the Yemen war, maintaining a truce with Iran, and prioritizing domestic reform over foreign entanglements such as the Russian-Ukrainian war and the recent US-led coalition in the Red Sea.
Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman al-Saud. Photo by Anadolu Images
For the Saudis, a war with Iran – whether started by Israel or anyone else – is a no-win scenario. It will be fought in their backyard and the Arabs will bear the brunt of the devastation. Arab soil will be the battleground because Israel and Iran have no common borders. Such a war would shatter Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) vision of a prosperous and unified Middle East, a dream he once likened to a ‘new Europe’. Instead, the region could tragically morph into a post-World War II Europe, divided and set back for decades.
As a key player in the global oil market, Saudi Arabia is acutely aware of the economic consequences of any disruption to oil supplies in the event of a regional war. The recent example of the Houthis, a relatively small group, posing a critical threat to international shipping routes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden during the Gaza conflict, albeit with subtle efforts at prevention by the ad hoc US-UK-led naval coalition. In addition, the kingdom’s proximity to conflict zones and the presence of Iranian-backed militias in neighboring Iraq and Yemen on Iran’s axis of resistance pose significant security threats.
Before even considering such a fight, the Saudis need ironclad security guarantees from their Western allies, the same kind that Israel enjoys to ensure deterrence. Frankly, that’s a tall order, at least for now. While their offensive capabilities exceed those of Iran, the Saudis recognize the need for robust air defences to counter Iran’s extensive arsenal of missiles and drones. This concern underscores the importance of President Donald Trump’s 2020 proposal for a Middle East NATO against Iran, particularly one that unites Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Arab states.
Building on the momentum of the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, the US envisioned a regional defence cooperation framework. This included transferring Israel’s operational area of responsibility from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and proposing integrated air and missile defence (IAMD). This vision seems to be bearing fruit, albeit in a fragile and secretive way.
Although acknowledged by Israel and denied by Arab governments, including Riyadh, reports from outlets such as the Wall Street Journal suggest that Saudi Arabia has played a role in intercepting Iranian missiles and drones. Of course, this was a sign of cooperation, not an intention to engage in a full-scale war between the two. Unlike Arab officials, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant openly saw it as “an opportunity to build a strategic alliance against this serious threat from Iran, which threatens to put nuclear explosives on the heads of these missiles”.
Iran’s attack on Israel served two purposes. First, it exposed Israel’s formidable air defenses and unwavering Western support, which boasts an impressive, reported 99% intercepting success rate. Second, this narrative would undoubtedly spark a parallel drive for advanced defence capabilities in Saudi Arabia, while raising concerns about unequal treatment of allies in the face of the Iranian threat. It reminds us of how the Saudis have endured a serious threat from Iranian-backed Houthi rebels since 2015 (over 430 ballistic missiles and 851 armed drones).
President Biden’s complex relationship with Saudi Arabia’s MbS has further complicated the situation, shaking security assurances. Attacks by Iranian-supplied Houthi missiles and drones on key Saudi energy facilities in 2019 and 2021 marked a turning point. The subsequent US withdrawal of Patriot missile batteries in 2021 exacerbated feelings of abandonment and a lack of US commitment, as expressed by Prince Turki Al-Faisal to CNBC, ‘not indicative of America’s stated intention to help Saudi Arabia defend itself against external enemies’.
Recently, Saudi Arabia took a step back from discord with Iran, a step towards normalization with Israel, and another towards a security pact with the US before the presidential elections in November. But the outbreak of the Hamas-Israel war has halted progress on these fronts. One reason is Saudi Arabia’s balancing of moral imperatives with strategic considerations.
Traditionally a champion of the Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia finds it morally and popularly unacceptable to ally itself with the Jewish state (Israel) occupying Palestinian territory and recently killing 33,000 in Gaza against the Shiite Muslim state (Iran), especially at a time of war. But despite discreet cooperation with Israel, Saudi Arabia is officially stuck in a ‘chicken or the egg’ conundrum. Should a solution to the Palestinian problem come before normalizing relations with Israel, or vice versa?
Precarious neutrality reigns
In a multipolar regional landscape where Iran and Israel, both adversaries of the Arabs, are engaged in a protracted conflict, Saudi Arabia will arguably gain a strategic advantage in the regional balance of power. It is worth noting that the Arab Israeli enmity predates that of Iran and has been unresolved since 1948.
The Saudis may consider themselves fortunate to have cautiously forged a truce with Iran and avoided formal normalization with Israel, which would provide a strategic buffer in the event of war. This stance may allow them to maintain neutrality, be ready to mediate, or at least send an appeasing message to Iran if necessary.
In Saudi Arabia’s quest for foreign policy autonomy, neutrality has become one of its strategic tools. It allows Riyadh to avoid entanglement in US rivalries, as seen in conflicts such as the Russian-Ukrainian war and the brewing Israeli Iranian escalation. Such detachment is in line with Saudi political and economic interests.
Indeed, any attempt by Saudi Arabia to remain neutral in a looming war between Israel and Iran is a precarious balancing act. The kingdom hosts some American business and defence assets on its soil, including Patriot batteries, which necessitates routine cooperation with the US, especially in contingencies such as an Israeli Iranian war.
But such cooperation comes at a price. Iranian leaders have repeatedly threatened to retaliate against any US aggression, likely targeting these very interests in Saudi Arabia and beyond. Such action will jeopardize the fragile, years-old reconciliation with Iran that many had hoped would finally cool decades of hostility. Riyadh also fears the conflict could spill over and reignite the war with Iranian-backed Houthi rebels – an eight-year war from which they had just emerged after a shaky ceasefire almost two years ago.
Dragging into the fray?
A war between Iran and Israel would bear a strong resemblance to the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, a reminder that history often repeats itself. Like Iraq at the time, Israel is perceived by Saudi Arabia as a less immediate threat than Iran. Despite Saudi Arabia’s initial stance of neutrality, the need to counterbalance a rising and ideologically opposed Iran eventually led it to support Iraq, albeit indirectly, a potentially similar scenario with Israel in the event of a war with Iran.
Such a policy is now equally fragile. Sitting on the fence and refusing airspace and territory for US operations against Iran could damage Saudi credibility and relations with Washington. The Saudis fear being seen as a US scapegoat, but in the worst-case scenario they could be pressured into allowing US strikes from their soil. Ali Shihabi, a Saudi journalist close to the royal court, acknowledges this possibility in the Financial Times, but only “if the US takes responsibility for the consequences”.
Either way, US involvement would inevitably draw Saudi Arabia into a fight with Iran for its own security.
